This is an ad for an upcoming lecture in NY. There is not a lot of information here but interesting none-the-less.
NEW YORK LECTURES
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OCTOBER 2010
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Arnold Pfeffer
Centre for Neuropsychoanalysis
at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute
The mirroring mechanism for action and other mirroring mechanisms in our brain represent sub-personal instantiations of embodied simulation. Embodied simulation provides a new empirically based notion of intersubjectivity, viewed first and foremost as intercorporeity. Embodied simulation challenges the notion that Folk-psychology is the sole account of interpersonal understanding. Underlying our capacity for “mind reading” is intercorporeity as the main source of knowledge we directly gather about others. Parallel to the detached third-person sensory perception of social stimuli, internal non-linguistic “representations” of the body-states associated with actions, emotions, and sensations are evoked in the observer, as if he or she were performing a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation.
By means of an isomorphic format we can map others’ actions onto our own motor representations, as well as others’ emotions and sensations onto our own viscero-motor and somatosensory representations. Social cognition is not only explicitly reasoning about the contents of someone else’s mind. Our brains, and those of other primates, appear to have developed embodied simulation as a basic functional mechanism that gives us a direct insight of other minds, thus enabling our capacity to empathize with others.
This proposal opens new perspectives on our understanding of psychopathological states and therapeutic relations.
Discussant: Mark Solms
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Olšanský (Wednesday, 08 August 2012 09:18)
Great info, thanks